

Chapter One

EXPERIENCE AND THEORY IN AESTHETICS

Art is both fascinating and perplexing, and since the time of classical Greece people have attempted to understand how it works and what it means. In the earliest discussions of art, philosophers wondered about its nature: What is art and how does it relate to the cosmos? They puzzled over how art objects are created, and extolled human skills that become at times godlike in their powers. But perhaps the central question for philosophers like Plato and Aristotle concerned our involvement with art: the response we have to beautiful things, the moral and salubrious powers of art, and perhaps most of all, the power of art to transform and transcend, leading us into a condition of enhanced perception that may be wondrous, dangerous, and at times overwhelming.

There was a richness of discussion in the classical age that centered around art as an activity: an activity that is at once cosmic, social, and individual; an activity that brings understanding of a sort and may be salutary and even exalting. In the modern age, however, this has changed. Questions about art have shifted to the idea of experience, paralleling the great change in the focus of philosophy from matters of ontology to those of epistemology. In place of starting from an examination of the nature of the universe and moving to the human position in the order of things, we have come to realize, since Descartes and Kant, that all inquiry has its inception in a human locus. Now at the end of the twentieth century we have come to recognize that the human factor in every kind of awareness and knowledge is

structurally unavoidable.

The scope of our claims has narrowed, then, and while the human place has become less cosmic, it is more pervasive and personal. Whatever the world be, we can only encounter it and know it as humans. Thus we may be less likely to ask what makes something art than we would be to consider how our experience of art is to be explained, and when we pose the former question, we answer it in terms of the latter. Theories of beauty have given way to doctrines of emotion, meaning, communication, with even symbol being regarded as the embodiment of feeling. And questions that purport to be about art objects, like the search for aesthetic qualities, turn out to be attempts to locate experiential properties of such objects, since such properties as 'delicate,' 'graceful,' 'elegant,' 'lovely,' and 'beautiful' require aesthetic sensitivity to be perceived.¹

Writings on aesthetics and the arts have proliferated since the Enlightenment, a tribute to the ceaseless activity of artists, the broadening of their public, and the ever strong influence of art and the uses to which that influence has been put. One can identify in this literature a continuing body of doctrine that derives from formulations shaped during the eighteenth century, when the shift from the being of art to its experience occurred and modern aesthetics first emerged. Early in that century, the various arts coalesced into a generally accepted set of fine arts in which they were compared with one another and organized by the same principles.² And in the writings of many of the same men who had codified the body of fine arts, there developed a coherent set of beliefs about art which, by the latter part of the eighteenth century, had achieved the status of a separate discipline. This was a seminal period that redirected the course of aesthetics and established the field as we know it today. Adapted and transmuted in the subsequent two centuries, this theory of the fine arts was rarely challenged.³

A brief look at some writing of that period will serve to illustrate its characteristic themes.

The work of the British theorists of the eighteenth century deals not so much with characterizations of art in general as with the types and locations of beauty and the manner in which it is apprehended.

The problem for them lay in determining with what objects beauty occurs and what traits of imagination are needed to respond to it pleurably. While its beauty comes from a principle of meaning, regulation, and order which must be supplied by the mind, it is beyond dispute that beauty is a characteristic of objects. The task lies in identifying such beauty. Thus in 1711 Shaftesbury wrote of the painter that "his piece, if it be beautiful, and carries truth, must be a whole, by itself, complete, independent, and withal as great and comprehensive as he can make it." Art, then, is concerned with beauty, and beauty is associated with an object.

Now such beauty is to be found not in the material from which art is fashioned but only when that material acquires something that beautifies it. Art is what beautifies matter, and since there is no principle of beauty in the physical object, that principle of meaning, regulation, and order must be supplied by the mind.⁴ Moreover, a particular sort of attention is necessary to apprehend such beauty, one which considers the object for its own sake without regard to further purposes.

Thus arose the famous notion of disinterestedness, an attitude that denotes the perception of an object for its own sake without regard to further purposes, and which requires the separation of the object from its surroundings in order to contemplate it freely and with no distracting considerations. Disinterestedness emerged as the mark of a new and distinctive mode of experience called aesthetic, a kind of awareness distinct from more commonly recognized alternative modes, such as instrumental, cognitive, moral, and religious experience.

It was in the work of Kant that the concept of aesthetic disinterestedness became fixed and assumed a distinct and integral place in aesthetic theory, just as aesthetics itself was

integrated into a comprehensive philosophical system. While Kant remained true to the classical view of art as an activity of making, he described beautiful art as a product which pleases us solely in the act of judging it, not by pure sensation or by its conformity to a concept such as that of having a purpose.⁵ For Kant distinguished aesthetic perception by its separation from interests that have a practical concern or end; it is distinct from the apprehension of objects in ordinary experience. Taste, he held, then, is the faculty of judging or representing an object by a satisfaction or dissatisfaction that is entirely disinterested, and it is the object of such satisfaction that is called beautiful.

So it came about that the experience of art took on central importance and that we were held to attain this experience through the use of the special attitude of disinterestedness.⁶ Separating the experience of beauty from sensory pleasure or ordinary emotions, Kant effectively removed it from a locus in human affairs and attenuated its grounding in somatic activity to the point of dematerialization. And by making taste disinterested, he provided the theoretical impetus for isolating art from commerce with the world of human activity and setting it in its own region beyond the command of practical affairs. However, art may retain some resemblance to the realm of practice through the judgment of taste, which exhibits "purposiveness without purpose."⁷

Related to this idea is the requirement that the art object be demarcated from its surroundings and set off as an independent and integral work instead of being diffused across "the walls, the ceilings, the staircases, the cupolas, and other remarkable places either of churches or palaces." As Shaftesbury put it, "[W]e may give to any particular work the name *Tablature* when the work is in reality 'a single piece, comprehended in one view, and formed according to one single intelligence, meaning, or design; which constitutes a real whole, by a mutual and necessary relation of its parts, the same as of the members in a natural body'."⁸

Hutcheson and Reid developed this characterization further. The former sought to inquire into the quality in objects that excites our ideas of beauty and harmony, which he discovered in pleasing formal relations, especially as they are found in what he called the compound ratio between uniformity and variety.⁹

And Reid, toward the end of the century, tried to determine what is common to all objects in which beauty can be found, a condition he located "in the moral and intellectual perfections of mind, and in its active powers...."¹⁰

From this formative period in the history of modern aesthetics there emerged an identification of the art object as separate and distinct from that which surrounds it and isolated from the rest of life. As Munsterberg put it much later, "To isolate the object for the mind, means to make it beautiful, for it fills the mind without an idea of anything else: ...this complete repose, where the objective impression becomes for us an ultimate end in itself is the only possible content of the true experience of beauty."¹¹ Such an object requires a special attitude for its proper appreciation, a disinterested attitude with which the object is regarded in the light of its own intrinsic qualities with no concern for ulterior purposes. This is a tenet echoed regularly through the halls of academe by such phrases as Bullough's well known notion of psychical distance and Ortega's less gracious 'dehumanization.'¹² Stolnitz summed up two centuries of discussion when he defined the aesthetic attitude as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone."¹³

While formulated in the eighteenth century, the doctrine of disinterested contemplation has its roots in the distant past. Aristotle's contemplative model of cognitive experience still rules the realm of aesthetics, and one can read the history of the philosophy of art up to recent times as a reflection of its powerful impact. For St. Thomas, to cite another early instance, art shares the same intuitive certainty of the axioms and proofs of logic as direct, non-inferential knowledge: "Clarity is for beauty what evidence is for truth."¹⁴ Thus in its purity and directness

art stands whole and untouched, and the proper attitude toward art is that of an observer. The contemplative ideal of disinterested attention has continued largely unchallenged to the present day.¹⁵

The pattern of thought that developed at this time has become integral to discussions about art, hardening into a set of axioms which have since acquired the stature of unquestioned and inviolable dogmas. Three, in particular, are pertinent here: that art consists primarily of objects, that art objects possess a special status, and that such objects must be regarded in a unique way. One might read this account as a mere reiteration of obvious truths and wonder at the value of documenting a tradition so well established as to seem irrefutable. We shall pursue these aesthetic axioms more directly in the next chapter. Yet if they presume to describe the experience of beauty, and if experience is to provide the basis for aesthetic understanding, we might expect the first order of business to be a clear, unassumptive query about the characteristics of such experience.

What kind of theory would emerge from an examination of the experiences we have with art? Experience is the central term here, and all that we can say about art and the aesthetic is in some way an elaboration of this notion. In attempting to answer the question, it is essential to escape the prevalent tendency to regard the notion of experience as a purely subjective, psychological event, a tendency that emerges in phenomenology as strongly as in traditional empiricism. Let me begin, then, by attempting to disentangle the concept of experience from the hereditary characteristics it has acquired during the past two centuries.

To the western philosophical mind the term 'experience' connotes 'empiricism,' and 'empiricism,' in turn, is likely to suggest the major tradition in British philosophy. What we have inherited from that history, it, too, a product of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is a view of experience as the composite product of separate, discrete sensations. Whether these

unitary perceptions be called "ideas that we receive from sensation" (Locke), "ideas actually imprinted on the senses" (Berkeley), "impressions" (Hume), calculable units of pleasure or pain (Bentham) or, as with more recent writers, sense data or other immediately given percepts, what is alleged that these elements are what we experience directly and immediately.¹⁶ Furthermore, all knowledge is derived from these elements by combining and ordering them into the more complex structures of our cognitive world. Now such units of perception are sensory ones and it is from this that experience is said to have a subjective ground, for is not sensation something that can be traced to the mind? Is it not a personal, inner awareness, an effect caused by impinging causes from the world outside?

Now if we apply to the question of experience the same Occamist rigor that the empiricist tradition urges us to direct toward logical and metaphysical claims, it is clear that such an account of experience is neither descriptive nor simple. Like traditional aesthetics, it pre-judges our experience by imposing on it a division between the human person and the world that, for all its initial plausibility, rests on a particular historical and cultural tradition not shared in other times and places. A clear alternative to the dualistic claims of the empiricist tradition lies in the claim for a continuity of experience, joining perceiver with the world in complex patterns of reciprocity. The universal scope of this view has been emerging slowly during the past century and its range in the physical and social sciences, in culture, and in philosophy is far too broad to consider here. But the continuity of experience as exemplified in art may perhaps serve as an example and a model for other areas of inquiry and not an exception or afterthought, which is how the theory of art has often been treated. Our Western involvement with science and technology, where the atomistic pattern of experience has proved so effective, may have provided us with a misleading paradigm.

* For it is my claim that the experience of the arts not only exhibits a unity of experience but that holistic experience occurs in ways that are at some times subtle and at others obvious

and compelling. The contemporary arts, in particular, frequently insist on experiences of engagement by provoking us into movement or action or by forcing us into adjustments in vision or imagination. Moreover, one can attain such experiential unity with the traditional arts as well as with the recent ones.

Yet the pattern of separation remains prevalent in the way the arts are treated. In the effort to keep art distinct from other activities and objects in human culture, our aesthetic encounters are usually channelled along a carefully paved course through official cultural institutions--galleries, museums, concert halls, auditoriums. Such confinement not only often restricts the force of the arts; it conspires to erect obstructions that inhibit our openness to artistic modes that do not conform to those requirements. Moreover, it forces aesthetic theory that is modeled on its constraints to scurry after in a vain attempt to keep up with the irrepressible inventiveness of artists. By attempting to decide the acceptable modes of artistic action and appreciative response, aesthetics ends by legislating itself into irrelevance. To approach the question of aesthetic experience as a personal, inner awareness, which requires an explanation of the connection between the appreciative act and the object of appreciation, would clearly be a misstep off the presuppositionless path.

There have been some who have avoided this subjectivistic reduction. When Bergson writes of the difference between relative and absolute knowing, he is identifying the same alternative between the dualistic relation with a separate object and the unitary condition of direct apprehension. The first offers knowledge that is external; the second knowledge that lies within. But Bergson's reference to knowledge is unlike our common, more literal use of that term. For him knowledge is a condition of awareness, a grasping of something, not a proposition or a statement of fact. Yet Bergson's fascination with the different ways of knowing an object is nonetheless still an intellectual preoccupation. Despite his agreement with common sense that reality is independent of the mind, his account of knowing offers an answer to the

question of how we can gain an awareness of something by placing it within a cognitive frame, and his concern is with the mental act of knowing an object by a kind of "intellectual sympathy," as he calls it.¹⁷

There is more to the experience of art, however, than mental involvement, and others have pursued ways in which the whole person, not just mind, intellect, or consciousness, is engaged. One thinks of the notion of Einfuhlung that Lipps developed about the same time that Bergson was writing. For Lipps, Einfuhlung or empathy begins not with a separate object with which we then have aesthetic enjoyment and not with such a pleasure taken in an object, but with both the object and the pleasure drawn together in a single act. "Empathy is the fact that the antithesis between myself and the object disappears, or rather does not yet exist."¹⁸ This is more than a psychic unity. Even though Lipps retains the notion of contemplation in his account, empathy is a concept that incorporates movement or activity. This activity is bound up with the observed object, both by being derived from it and by being inseparable from it. When empathy with a physical movement takes place, there is a consciousness that is wholly identical with the movement. "In a word, I am now with my feeling of activity entirely and wholly in the moving figure. Even spatially, if we can speak of the spatial extent of the ego, I am in its place."¹⁹ There is an identity here, yet this is no passive identity or purely visual assimilation, nor does it involve a private sensation or pleasure in an object. It is rather the activity of feeling oneself into the aesthetic object, an activity which engages not just our attention but also kinesthetic sensations, such as the muscle tensions which are so insistent a part of dance appreciation.

Dewey adopts a still more explicit recognition of total organic involvement in art. The biological, evolutionary model underlies his account of experience and, when he turns to art, he applies the same factors. Whether one's interests be scientific or aesthetic, "the ultimate matter of both emphases in experience is...the constant rhythm that marks the interaction of the live

creature with his surroundings."²⁰ The function of art is consciously to restore "the union of sense, need, impulse and action characteristic of the live creature."²¹ Such an occurrence is integrated and consummated in what Dewey calls 'an experience,' the distinguishing mark of the aesthetic.

Aesthetic involvement is carried still further in Merleau-Ponty's discussion of perception as a synthesis which finds unity and wholeness in our sensory grasp of objects. Such a synthesis involves the "body as the field of perception and action" and yet goes beyond what is directly perceived to a whole, a totality, which is ultimately the world itself.²² In his description of seeing, Merleau-Ponty carries this idea of physical engagement to art, particularly painting. "Since things and my body are made of the same stuff, vision must somehow take place in them; their manifest visibility must be repeated in the body by a secret visibility."²³

More recently, Mikel Dufrenne has continued this theme of perceptual unity. In aesthetic experience the spectator assists in revealing the aesthetic object, an object that is both a thing and its meaning and that exists through the perceiver and not outside that person. Yet it is only in perception that the being of the aesthetic object is realized. Not constituted by consciousness, it nonetheless exists only for a consciousness able to recognize it. Like Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne argues that this produces a relation of subject and object in which each exists only by means of the other, as a kind of reconciliation of the two. There is no opposed physical object here whose presence is externally related to the appreciator. One must enter into the work in an intimate fashion, active not as a pure spectator but as an involved viewer.²⁴

Such characterizations of aesthetic experience as these vary in the degree of engagement of perceiver and object which they recognize. They may even admit, as Dufrenne does, of a paradox between the appreciator's absorption in the object and the distance imposed

by its independent identity.²⁵ Whatever their differences, these accounts reflect a development that extends aesthetic experience well beyond a state of mind that is separate and distinct from the aesthetic object, beyond a psychological attitude or an act of consciousness. They join in stressing involvement, ranging from multi-sensory synaesthesia to somatic action and continuity with the object.

These have been some of the significant stages in the emergence of the notion of unitary perception in aesthetic experience as the idea has gradually taken form and shaped an alternative to the theory of disinterestedness. Yet these efforts remain bound in certain respects to the very theory they intend to displace. For the development of unitary perception has followed an uneven course, often hampered by vestiges of an incompatible past, which are difficult to recognize and set aside. Even though they challenge key elements of disinterestedness theory, they often retain other features of that theory--its psychologism, its concentration on the spectator, its essential passivity, the autonomy of the art object.

[Begin here with ch.3, contemp.arts?]

Yet the purpose of aesthetics is to clarify and explain our experience with the arts, and all theoretical assertions stand ultimately on their ability to do this. While the arts of the past might appear to corroborate the customary explanations, this is only apparent, for the appreciation of the traditional arts has been impeded and distorted by doctrines that misrepresent aesthetic activity.²⁶ However, it is in considering the history of the arts from the perspective of the present that the inadequacy of these doctrines becomes most striking.

The experiences and practices of the arts provide a challenge to theory that is intimidating. The fascination that we feel at first often turns into bafflement when we attempt to understand and explain them, for the arts confront us with a disconcerting array of materials

and perceptual activities. And when we look at the contemporary arts, this variety seems to take on the character of a melange. Traditional aesthetics is uncomfortable with sharply new materials, such as plastics, electronic sounds, and found words and objects. It has difficulty accounting in a coherent and systematic way for artistic developments, as in process art, in which the product is secondary to the activity of producing it, and for artistic activities that have purely ephemeral objects or no identifiable objects at all. Nor can the tradition in aesthetics easily absorb the deliberate elimination of the customary devices of order from various arts. Even the distinctions among the arts have broken down, and we are often unable to decide where a new development belongs: whether, for example, environments are sculpture or architecture; assemblages are paintings or sculptures; Happenings are theater, painting (as an outgrowth of action painting), or an entirely new art form synthesizing elements of theater, sculpture, dance, painting, and music; and where, if anywhere, performance art can be placed. In fact, multi-media developments like performance art seem deliberately to rebuff the usual classifications of both artists and their art, as music, dance, theatrical spectacle, film, and poetry merge into an inseparable flow of aesthetic events. And among the conventional arts, too, basic distinctions fail to hold. We find it difficult to draw a clear line between design, decoration, illustration, and fine art; between musical sound and noise; or between architecture and environmental sculpture.

The evolution of the arts in the twentieth century has often been described as experimental, controversial, even chaotic. This is hardly the first time artistic innovations have evoked confusion and dismay. Still, in our own time there is a greater variety of diverse, independent, even conflicting movements and strands of development than in any previous period. Some commentators have extolled the new for its differences and its freshness; others have condemned it for its iconoclasm, its sensationalism, or its opportunism. But the artistic impulse toward fresh perceptions persists and, with the passage of time, history has accommodated itself to innovation and change by enlarging its embrace, as the "wild beasts" of

the present become the masters of the recent past.

Yet the contemporary arts exhibit more than an expansion of styles, materials, and techniques, for technical innovations do not stand alone. They influence more than the forms of the arts: they affect the manner in which we engage with and appreciate art. And it is here in our relation to the arts that the most profound transformations have occurred, for artists have altered our very ability to identify what art is and our capacities for experiencing it. These are the changes that carry the most significance for aesthetics. By modifying what we accept as art and by re-ordering the conditions and character of our experience of it, these developments have at the same time undermined the customary beliefs through which people have comprehended, appreciated, and esteemed art. In the face of all this it is presumptuous for the theory of the arts to decree what qualifies as art and aesthetic. The converse is more appropriate: Aesthetic theory must examine that practice carefully and consider how best to respond to this alteration and enlargement of the traditional station of the arts.

It is precisely in accounting for many of the new developments in the arts that the traditional axioms of aesthetics have shown themselves increasingly inadequate. During the early years of this century, art movements arose which contradicted one or another of the received principles. By mid-century, however, the arts had developed to the point at which the principles were no longer simply inadequate but had become utterly irrelevant in general. Let me illustrate the unsuitability of these principles by setting them individually against cases that are representative of major developments in the recent history of the arts. Many of these movements have by now assumed "official" status and have been absorbed into the mainline history of the arts, where their very presence in that history denies those received principles.²⁷ While this entire book makes a case for an aesthetics of engagement, using support from various arts and from historical analysis, the need for such an explanation is nowhere clearer than in the art of this century.

Let me begin the process of refutation and reconstruction, then, by holding up against the practices of recent art each of the eighteenth century principles that we have identified. While this is a preliminary argument, it is not intended to make a special case. Rather it will exhibit clearly and boldly the inadequacies of the traditional view and the kinds of features that must replace it. For purposes of clarity, the discussion that follows will consider these principles in order, but many of the instances I shall mention refute them all. For indeed, these are not independent axioms but interdependent supports of a single obsolete philosophical structure.

The assumption that art consists primarily of objects has been challenged and undermined in both obvious and subtle ways. With increasing frequency during the past century, the art object has become less important in the aesthetic situation and at times has vanished altogether. Although parallel developments have occurred in other arts, perhaps we can illustrate best how the art object has receded to unimportance by looking at the visual arts, whose modern history is well known. This change can be seen clearly in the sequence of movements that began in the late nineteenth century and has continued to the present: impressionism, cubism, futurism, dada, expressionism, abstract expressionism, optical art, and conceptual art. It was an evolution that started with the dissolution of the representational object within the traditional painting, shifted to the importance of perceptual experience, and concluded with the disappearance of the painting, itself. Braque boldly asserted this change in approach: "I do not paint objects, I paint the relations between objects."²⁸ Let us look at this sequence of stages more closely.

Impressionist painting began the process. It dissolved the substantiality of things into atmospheric appearances, from the pointillism of Seurat, whose dabs of brilliant, pure color needed to be mixed by the eye to form a semblance of the coherence and solidity of things in sunlight, to Monet's multiple versions of haystacks, the cathedral at Rouen, lines of poplars, the Seine, and other landscapes under the momentary conditions of the passing sun. These suggest

a painterly exemplification of Berkeley's slogan of the century before, "To be is to be perceived."

Yet the dissolution of the pictorial object, separate and independent, only began with the Impressionists. The apparent solidity and permanence of objects do not just dissolve under the fleeting changes of light and atmosphere; these ephemeral objects also inhabit the transitory domain of duration, and painters rendered the very temporality of the perceptual process in various ways. Analytical cubism flattened out the thickness of things by delivering a multiplicity of perspectives simultaneously on the same picture plane, while the futurism of Boccioni, Balla, and Severini portrayed the world by fragmenting objects into the dynamic patterns of motion. In a similar fashion Duchamp's descending nudes unfolded into nothing more than their movement, so that the painterly object was no longer a coherent whole enduring temporal changes but rather an abstract construct conceptually conjoined from its passing presence.

The perceptual process took a psychological turn in the work of the Expressionists, whose subjects were transfigured by their emotive significance as the painter's heart spoke through his hand. In surrealism the painter's oneiric world dominated his visual one, and painting relied more a metaphorical than a literal image. Magritte provides a clear illustration of the key role of imaginative consciousness. A master of the realistic image, Magritte nonetheless did not develop his art out of his skill in rendering what is seen directly. The uniqueness of his sensibility lies rather in the effectiveness with which he excites the awareness of what is not seen at all but contributed instead by the consciousness of the viewer. Birds in a cage, Magritte once remarked, are a known and expected combination. We can get a more interesting image if we put a fish or a shoe in a cage. "But though these images are strange, they are unhappily accidental, arbitrary. It is possible to obtain a new image which will stand up to examination through having something final, something right about it: it is the image showing an egg in the cage."²⁹ What Magritte observes reflects the truth of any effective metaphor, where the revealing juxtaposition is its most general condition.

In the third quarter of the twentieth century these developments expanded into the many modes of non-objective painting and sculpture. Trends such as abstract expressionism, optical art, and color field painting require active involvement in the visual perception of ambiguities in linear configurations, and of patterns, textures, and color relationships in order for the work to function at all. Moreover, appreciative engagement is hardly confined to the visual arts. In speaking of modernist fiction, for example, Annie Dillard observes that the art object's "doing, however internal, requires a perceiver to complete its value." Similar instances can easily be drawn from all the major arts.³⁰

Now these disappearances of the object occur within the enduring boundaries of larger things, and it may be argued that even though objects may vanish within a painting, the picture as an art object remains. Many instances appear, however, in which that very object begins to disintegrate. In the installation piece "Les fausses confidences" (The False Confidences) (1983),³¹ Giulio Paolini has placed a number of merely primed canvases in a low arrangement, while a slide image is projected above them, exemplifying the liberation of the image from the art object. Then there are works in which the entire object recedes into insignificance, becoming merely the occasion for exciting a condition of awareness. Dada illustrates this in those instances where the art object is trivial or obscure, leading appreciation to rest on the meanings associated with it rather than on the object itself. Dada is more than a parody of the sanctimonious attitude toward art that its name signifies: it is a revitalization of aesthetic experience by transferring attention from the exhausted art object into the realm of meaning.

Consider Duchamp's "The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors", the "Large Glass" (1915-1923). Offering "a mechanistic and cynical interpretation of the phenomenon of love,"³² this sculpture of oil, lead wire, foil, dust, and varnish on two large glass panes joined to form a vertical panel offers its strongest impression iconographically rather than visually. Only when

explicated as the ideally projected working of two love machines, utilizing a hermetic iconography that draws from Duchamp's earlier works, does its message of sexual futility emerge.³³ Yet visual obscurity is not the only condition in which meaning supersedes the object. Duchamp's "Etant Donnee" ("The Door of the Given: 1. The Waterfall 2. The Illuminating Gas") (1946-1966)³⁴ is his counterpart to the transparency of the "Large Glass)". This sculpture takes an obvious subject-matter--it is a realistic diorama of a meadow with a nude lying suggestively supine in the foreground--but makes it accessible to the viewer only by looking through a pair of tiny peepholes situated in a dark corner. Thus the position of the spectator turns him or her unavoidably into a voyeur and adds the peculiar significance of experiencing that meaning to the perceptual consciousness of the object.

The dadaist transformation of the art object into its meaning was extended to its fullest degree in conceptual art. Here meaning so dominates aesthetic consciousness that the object often devolves into trivial gestures, as in Sol Lewitt's "Six Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty-Five Lines" (1970), a surface covered with thirty-three rows of short, parallel vertical lines drawn freehand, or in Vito Acconci's "Step Piece", a record of a daily sequence of steppings onto and down from a stool at a steady rate of speed, performed as a daily series for a month.³⁵ In fact, the object may disappear altogether, as in Richard Fleishner's conceptual sculpture, "Sited Works," in which photographs of striking natural and human-made shapes were placed at various sites at which the viewer was asked to reconstruct their presence imaginatively. Happenings are another recent phase in the dissolution of the independent object. This development was somewhat akin to theater, however there was often no audience but only participants who pursued in a largely improvisatory fashion the directions contained in a scenario.³⁶ Currently, performance art continues in the same direction, providing an occasion for display and participation in which the object is replaced by activity. Protesting against the commercialization and exploitation of the art object, the work of performance artists is deliberately ephemeral. Moreover, it characteristically overrides the conventional boundaries

between the traditional arts by employing mixed media performances, so that even if there were an object, it could not be identified. The various forms of process art, like action painting, earth art, conceptual art, and performance art de-emphasize the final product and stress the activity of making and grasping art. Just as Newton proved in 1666 that color was not a property of matter but rather of light as it interacts with objects, artists in this century seem to be showing us that art is not a property of objects but emerges from the perception by human beings in interaction with objects or events.

Theater provides many clear illustrations of the rejection of the second axiom, the principle which accords a special status to art objects. Some artists in this century have been intrigued by the ordinariness of things, by those very features that make them undistinguished, and where their significance lies not in what is presented but in what rises up between the cracks, as it were. The tragic hero becomes a nondescript, unsuccessful salesman; the dramatic situation is discerned in the transcript of a trial; the poetry of language is sacrificed to the dull mundanities of common speech. Waiting for Godot is probably the best known example of this dethroning of the object, where eloquence of word and gesture, so closely associated with the traditional theater, is notably absent. Furthermore, action is virtually non-existent, and the force of the situation emerges from the intimations that rise out of the seemingly pointless reiteration of banalities and, perhaps even more, from the silences that interrupt them.

ESTRAGON: Ah! (Pause) You're sure it was here?

VLADIMIR: What?

EST: That we were to wait.

VLAD: He said by the tree. (They look at the tree).

Do you see any others?

EST: What is it?

VLAD: I don't know. A willow.

EST: Where are the leaves?

VLAD: It must be dead.

EST: No more weeping.

VLAD: Or perhaps it's not the season.

EST: Looks to me more like a bush.

VLAD: A shrub.

EST: A bush.³⁷

Similar instances in theater where art emerges from the depiction of the ordinary include such well-known plays as Beckett's "Krapp's Last Tape" and "Happy Days," and Albee's "The Zoo Story," "The American Dream," and "The Sandbox". Ionesco's "The Bald Soprano," is composed entirely of inane phrases taken from an English grammar book.

Dada again seems deliberately to deny any special status to art objects. Duchamp's readymades are often cited and frequently ridiculed, yet their artistic significance is nevertheless widely acknowledged. Much of the eloquence of the readymades lies precisely in their ordinary and undistinguished appearance and in the playfulness with which they twit serious aesthetic expectations. Bicycle wheels and urinals parody our search for significant form and our perception of aesthetic qualities. As for uniqueness, a readymade is by definition a standardized object³⁸ and placing it on a pedestal merely thrusts its ordinariness upon the viewer.

There are still more recent instances of art that deny the claim to distinguished stature. One can recognize such art in the assemblage, which often uses prosaic, everyday objects in sculptures and on the surface of paintings; in musique concrete, which utilizes often chance arrangements of the sounds that constitute the aural ambience of our industrial culture or constructs musical works by manipulating spoken texts electronically; in pop art, which presents the unadorned forms, surfaces, and images that pervade popular culture; in found poetry,

fashioned from chance arrangements of words obtained from mundane sources; and in objets trouves, sculpture made out of the detritus of industrial society. Moreover, older and recent technologies alike have generated lithographs, woodcuts, photographs, movies, books, and music recordings for which there is no original but only copies, thus dispensing with the hallowed traditional traits of uniqueness and rarity.

Most interesting of all, however, is the ingenuity with which many artists have contradicted the precept that art objects must be regarded with a special attitude. The experience of art is indeed distinctive, and the doctrine of disinterestedness attempted to promote it by putting a frame of sorts around art, thereby isolating it from the rest of human objects and activities and placing it in a special realm free from practical demands. This frame is primarily a psychological one, a shift in attitude that leads the appreciator to attend to the qualities of the art object without concern for the usual meanings and uses it may have in ordinary experience. Much of the recent history of the arts, however, reads as an intentional denial of disinterestedness, for artists have shaped works in every medium in which the active participation of the appreciator in completing the artistic process is essential to the aesthetic effect. This is not just a matter of bringing attention and interest to the situation but of making a perceptual and sometimes even a physical contribution to the work. Disinterestedness no longer identifies what is distinctive in the aesthetic situation.

With increasing insistence over the past century, artists have been moving toward producing work whose experience does not require isolation from the active involvements of daily life. Joining with ancient traditions in the practice and use of the arts, they have seized on the connections art has to human activities, instead of stressing its differences and discontinuities.³⁹ For one need not dissociate oneself from practice and use in order to take something on its own terms, as disinterestedness would have us do. Aesthetic experience becomes rather an emphasis on intrinsic qualities and experience than a shift in attitude. This

emphasis is not confined to special, narrow conditions but can be extended everywhere and to everything. Moreover, perception now stands in the forefront of active experience instead of merely providing cues for action and meaning, as it does in other situations. Most important, artists have been forcing us to realize that entering the world of art requires the active engagement of the total person and not just a subjective cast of mind. Such engagement emphasizes connections and continuities and it leads ultimately to the aestheticization of the human world. Art thus remains distinctive without being separate. Just as the doctrine of disinterestedness is the central principle of eighteenth century aesthetics, subsuming under it the belief that art refers to objects that possess a special and distinctive status, so the principle of aesthetic engagement has become the keystone of the new aesthetic sensibility.

Appreciative engagement occurs in different ways, depending on the period, style, and artistic modality. In the modern period artists have made this involvement explicit, and the many forms of participation may require a variety of overt actions. The most obvious instances are those in which the appreciator must perform some particular action in order for the art work to function completely. The patterns and colors of Agam's corrugated paintings change as the viewer walks by, so that the paintings become entirely different when seen from the right or the left, and the transformation becomes part of the experience of the work. There are sculptures whose appreciation requires one to walk into or through them, climb upon or re-position them. One is expected to clamber up or sit on Mark di Suvero's ride 'em pieces, such as "Homage to Brancusi," a wooden desk chair set on a steel rod, and his arrangements of balanced steel beams must be pushed into motion. Again, there are wall sculptures of polished metal that need the reflected image of their viewer to be complete. Wall pieces, paintings, and sculptures are common that respond to environmental stimuli, emitting sounds, echoes, or light on the approach of the appreciator.

While these are innovative uses of overt participation, visual art that uses more

traditional forms and technologies may work in similar ways by requiring an active perceiver.⁴⁰ Calder's stabiles can be contemplated from a distance, to be sure, but they often can (and should) be walked through as well as around so that their spaces, planes, mass, and curves can be perceived in continual rearrangement in relation to the body, just as this happens with his mobiles. In the one case the wind is the activator; in the other, the viewer. Indeed, the three dimensionality of most object sculpture requires a circumambulating perceiver to activate its potentialities of shifting surfaces, planes, and interrelations of volumes. Barbara Hepworth makes this explicit when she confesses, "I love working on a large scale so that the whole body of the spectator becomes involved." While painting does not usually take the form of shaped, three-dimensional canvases, the same participatory involvement is necessary. Jasper John's paintings of superimposed numbers are more than a writhing mixture of shapes and colors; they intrigue one into deciphering the forms of the figures, just as cubism requires the viewer to reassemble the multiple planes into a perceptual consciousness of three-dimensional objects. Indeed, such active discernment is a demand of all painting, from recent color field and minimalist art to traditional landscape and portrait painting, where the distance and direction of the viewer as well as an activating eye set the forces of the painting in motion. Even music, commonly considered an art of receptive enjoyment, has developed modes in which the audience must complete the work by singing or by making percussive sounds. In its more conventional forms, music also demands an active contribution by which the listener joins in the sequence of sounds shaped by the composer with an active awareness that regenerates the original order of experience.⁴¹

Innovations in theater have also appeared that disrupt dramatically the conventional protection of distance. Theater in the round, now a commonplace, breaks down the conventional separation between audience and performers by dispensing with the proscenium arch and having the audience surround the stage. This requires the actors to enter and exit through the audience, a practice that has also been adopted in more traditional theaters. Major

reforms that re-cast the conventions of theatrical production are most prominent, however, in the modern movement that began with Artaud and moved through Brecht, Joseph Chaikin's Open Theater, Julian Beck and Judith Malina's Living Theater, and Peter Brook's "Marat/Sade," to Grotowski's ritualistic theater and, later, his paratheatrics, which abolished any distinction between the actor and the spectator. This development in modern theater might be taken as exemplifying Stanislavsky's comment that you don't lose yourself in a role, which would be mystical; you find yourself in a role.

One especially striking instance of theatrical participation was the Open Theater's production of "The Serpent: A Ceremony." After a compelling pantomime in which Eve finally succumbs to the temptation of the apple, the stage was suddenly filled with an orgy of apples and actors all rolling about, the members of the entire company presenting apples to each another. Then the actors and apples spilled off the stage, and the players moved among the audience, offering the same treacherous temptation to the bewildered onlookers. The playwright Jean-Claude van Itallie expressed this changed theatrical mode very well: "The playwright's work is not so much to 'write a play' as to 'construct a ceremony'" in which the actors "are in some sense priests or celebrants, and the audience is drawn to participate with the actors in a kind of eucharist."⁴²

There are, however, still more subtle modes of participation that take us far beyond the psychological form of appreciative enjoyment found by assuming an attitude that embodies psychical distance. Detective novels that must be read and solved at a computer are only a more explicit use of the reader participation that all novels require. The modernist novel, for example, along with some notable precursors, makes the reader a collaborator in the fictional process. One is no longer entertained by a narrative whose clear line carries an orderly sequence of continuous events. In place of a plot developed in a more or less direct manner, situations, events, and perceptions are described which the reader is compelled to fit together in

order for the novel to become coherent.

Joseph Conrad's Chance (1913) may be taken as a precursor of the modernist novel in this respect. It is a tale whose reader must arrange the constant shifts of scene and time in order to fit the narrated events into their chronological sequence. The present-tense account with which the novel begins slips into the background until the very end, while the narrator, Marlow, supplies chapters from the strange history of Flora de Barral. Some of the occurrences are related as Marlow observed them, others as they were told to him by different people who entered Flora's life at critical points, and all are skillfully drawn together with a surprising conclusion in the fictional order of the present. Conrad's technique of fragmentation itself exemplifies the quality of chance that is the motif of the story. Moreover, it also forces the reader to collaborate more directly in the evocation of character and situation than would a simple narrative.

The classic modern case of novelistic fractionizing is undoubtedly Ulysses, where nearly eight hundred pages of florid detail depict characters, dialogue, situations and, more than anything, the ruminations of its actors. Yet such colorful abundance may obscure the fact that Joyce's expansive novel pursues a regular temporal narrative, encompassing but a single day in the life of Leopold Bloom, a day rich in the company of Dublin's distinctive types and culture. The reader must contribute to the work's coherence by discerning the order hidden amidst the thick flow of particulars.

More recent illustrations of this same fictional collaboration exist in profusion. One thinks of the nouveau roman, fiction that is highly descriptive of things and events, but always through "the eye which sees them, the thought which re-examines them, the passion which distorts them." In fact, as Robbe-Grillet put it, "the objects in our novels never have a presence outside human perception, real or imaginary; they are objects comparable to those in our daily lives, as they occupy our minds at every moment."⁴³ The Voyeur is an exemplary instance.⁴⁴

With emotionless accuracy, Robbe-Grillet describes the return of a watch salesman to the island on which he had been born long before and where he has gone for a day of business. With tireless detail, the author enumerates in a mundane, disconnected, and repetitious sequence Mathias' arrival, his colorless attempts at salesmanship, dull conversations, trivial ruminations. It is a confusion of memories and actual events, which only ends with his departure. Joining with Mathias' consciousness, one begins but gradually to realize that, amid this welter of thoughts and perceptions, he is likely responsible for the one notable event that occurred in the entire course of the novel, the death of a young girl, who was probably raped and murdered. The indefiniteness of consciousness remains to the end.

There is, then, a rich strand among the novels of this century in which the regular recounting of occurrences of a traditional narrative has little interest for the writer. Instead of reality we are given "hallucinations provoked by reality," as Gide once described his work. The lines between what happens and what is imagined are indiscernible and we are placed in the state of the characters, a "plane of delirium," in Celine's apt phrase, in which emotions and not objects are captured. Celine's own work offers the reader no objective narration, no difference between the things and events that take place and the full scope of the jostling emotions they evoke.⁴⁵ One is cast into the tawdry, seething undersurface of Parisian life, petty and mean but absorbing in its details and characters. No dispassionate gaze is possible, no curious but white-gloved gentility; you can touch that world only by entering it.

Other illustrations of fictional participation are easy to find. There is Nabokov's Pale Fire, a novel which flickers simultaneously among the incidents in an epic poem, in the life of its poet, and in that of the poem's commentator, and that are evoked in the exegesis of the poem. Another case is Lawrence Durrell's Alexandria Quartet, four novels, each purveying its own distinct perspective on the same events as fashioned through the eye and mind of a different participant. For the work to attain its complete effect, the reader must join together and

encompass, if not reconcile them. The parts of Durrell's Avignon Quintet, a more recent "quincunx" of five novels, as he calls it, are interconnected in still more complex involutions. Novelistic fragmentation is hardly new. It gives a discursive charm, for example, to Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy and Tobias Smollett's The Expedition of Humphrey Clinker from the eighteenth century. Recently, however, such techniques have become increasingly frequent, a recurrent theme in the modern novel.⁴⁶

Still other arts share a particular need for participation to attain appreciative fulfillment. There is film, which captures the consciousness of the viewer, making it join with the moving eye of the camera in a living sequence of events. There is architecture and urban design which, contrary to our usual expectations, do not offer contemplative objects but require human activity to complete them, perceptually as well as functionally. Dance, finally, carries irresistible somatic appeal, as the viewer's empathetic movement accompanies the dancer and, at times, even breaks out involuntarily into overt gesture.⁴⁷

[DELETE FROM HERE TO END?]

The account of aesthetic experience I have given here is both general and sweeping. Yet to be true to its descriptive origins it must be made specific. Support for a descriptive theory comes mainly from a concrescence of particulars, and the chapters in the parts of the book that follow offer this grounding. Each of these studies will pursue a different aspect of the theory in an individual context and from a distinctive perspective.

First, though, it will be useful to identify more clearly those ideas about art and the

aesthetic that dominate current theory and to demonstrate their ubiquity so that the scope of the matters at stake becomes clear. For what is said by critics and theorists is not confined within certain small circles. It becomes the underpinning, powerful yet often hidden, for the intellectual culture that surrounds art. More than this, it also shapes the expectations of the public that recognizes the strange and special force of the arts and attempts to grapple with their significance.

Further still, like all forceful ideas, those that have come to dominate our thinking about art have their history. And while history alone cannot explain their importance, it can surely help us understand their accrued meanings better and enable us to describe their influence. In this case, a lack of historical perspective has made us oblivious of any viable alternative in aesthetic theory and has lulled us into accepting the intellectual development of a particular time and place as a timeless truth and a final answer. One effective means for a critical examination of this body of doctrine, then, is to consider its evolution. This can provide us at the same time with an account of its development, its influence, and its limitations. Let us now turn to that.⁴⁸

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

-
1. See Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," in J. Margolis, Philosophy Looks at the Arts (New York: Scribner's, 1962), pp.63-87.

 2. The classic account of the historical coalescence of the various arts into a stable group of fine arts is Paul Oskar Kristeller's essay, "The Modern System of the Arts," in his Renaissance Thought II (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). See esp. pp.207, 215, 222-223, 225.

 3. The brief account of the emergence of modern aesthetics given here summarizes part of my developed study in "The Historicity of Aesthetics, I" in The British Journal of Aesthetics, 26/2 (Spring 1986), 101-111. Recent scholarship continues to probe into how the notion of disinterestedness arose to denote this special kind of attention, how it was disentangled from moral considerations of ends and consequences, and how it became established as the central trait of the aesthetic attitude. The seminal discussion of the historical emergence of aesthetic disinterestedness is Jerome Stolnitz's, "On the Origin of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness'," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism XX, 2 (Winter 1961), 131-143. More recent scholarship has contested Stolnitz's claim that a clear sense of 'aesthetic disinterestedness' can be found as far back as Shaftesbury. Saisselin detects the notion earlier in the French Enlightenment, while Townsend finds it entangled with the sense of 'experience,' showing no steady evolution but developing gropingly in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and the Scottish Enlightenment writers finally to emerge in its modern sense at the end of the eighteenth century in Kant. See Remy Saisselin, "A Second Note on Eighteenth

Century 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness'," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism XXI, 209; Dabney Townsend, "From Shaftesbury to Kant," Journal of the History of Ideas, 48, 2; and "Archibald Alison: Aesthetic Experience and Emotion," British Journal of Aesthetics, 28/2, 132-144. Attention to this important period in the history of modern aesthetics continues in the scholarship of George Dickie, Peter Kivy, Stephanie Ross, Noel Carroll, and Ted Cohen, among others.

The classic account of the historical coalescence of the various arts into a stable group of fine arts is Paul Oskar Kristeller's, "The Modern System of the Arts," in Renaissance Thought II (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp.207, 215, 222-223, 225.

4. Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711) (New York: 1900), Vol.I, p.94; Vol. II, pp. 136-7, 130-1.

5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (1790), Sects. 43, 45.

6. Kant, Critique of Judgment, Sect. 5. Further, when Kant describes taste as universal (Sects. 6-9), he frames his view within the cognitivist tradition that has dominated western thought since classical times.

7. Critique of Judgment, Sects. 11, 16. Kant, of course, was himself not as exclusive as this account may suggest, for he distinguished between pure and impure judgments of taste and admitted a relationship between the arts and culture. However, Kant's enormous and continuing influence, like that of most seminal thinkers, derives from a selective and therefore an unbalanced interpretation of his theory. The descendants of a theoretical giant are frequently more orthodox than the originator. It appears, furthermore, that this tendency toward enshrining disinterested perception as peculiarly aesthetic was not consistently or universally maintained at the time it was being formulated. See Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, pp.103, 104, 131-132.

8. Shaftesbury, "A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules" (1712), quoted in M. Fried, Absorption and Theatricality (U. of California Press, 1980), p.89.

9. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), 3rd ed. (London, 1729), Sect. II, Para. 1, 3.

10. Thomas Reid, On the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), "Of Beauty".

11. Hugo Munsterberg, The Principles of Art Education (1905). See

Calogero's more recent description of the aesthetic attitude as "lyrical equilibrium" in M. Rieser, "The Aesthetics of Guido Calogero," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXX, 1 (Fall 1971), 19-26.

12. Edward Bullough, "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Esthetic Principle," British Journal of Psychology V (1913). Reprinted in Melvin Rader, ed., A Modern Book of Esthetics, 3rd ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), pp. 394-411. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956).

13. Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1960), p.35.

14. See Maurice de Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1922), p.28.

15. It is obvious that any general statement (this one included) must be qualified in particular cases. The history of aesthetics, like the history of art, indeed like any history, includes such variety as to provide exceptions to any generalization. However, the task of historical review (and, in fact, the reason for its constant revision) is to identify from the ever-changing perspective of the present the dominant influences and trends

that have shaped the course of things. That is the purpose of this chapter.

16. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch.1, Sect. 2, 3. George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Part First, 1. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section II.

17. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.7 ff.

18. Theodor Lipps, "Empathy and Abstraction," in A Modern Book of Esthetics, 3rd ed., ed. Melvin Rader (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p.376.

19. Theodor Lipps, "Empathy and Abstraction," p.379.

20. John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934), p.15.

21. John Dewey, Art as Experience, p.25.

22. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Primacy of Perception," in The Primacy of Perception, ed. J.M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p.16.

23. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," in The Primacy of Perception, p.164.

24. Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans. by E. Casey et al (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp.51, 205, 71, 218, 219, 56, 55.

25. Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, p.232.

26. The history of appreciation stands independent of the history of the theory of appreciation, and it is likely that doctrines of disinterestedness have been more influential in academic circles than in artistic ones. A theoretical model that is expansive enough to encompass the arts of the present, if it is not to suffer from the same debilitating partiality as the eighteenth century view, must accommodate the traditional arts as well.

27. If the axioms are inadequate in any important instance, they are inadequate in general. Moreover, these developments cannot be dismissed merely as exceptions to the rule since, for universal claims, exceptions are contradictions.

28. Matisse made a similar claim, saying that he paints not objects but the differences between them.
29. Quoted in Annie Dillard, Living by Fiction (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).
30. Living by Fiction, p.176. Appreciative engagement is a major part of my thesis and its function in literature will be developed in Ch.7.
31. The Guggenheim Museum, New York, New York.
32. See Andre Breton, "Lighthouse of the Bride," in Robert Lebel, Marcel Duchamp (New York, 1959), p.92.
33. See William S. Rubin, Dada, Surrealism and Their Heritage (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1968), pp.19-21. See also Katherine S. Dreier and Matta Echaurren, Duchamp's Glass: An Analytical Reflection (New York, 1944); Arturo Schwarz, The Large Glass and Related Works (Milan, 1967).
34. The Philadelphia Museum of Art, Philadelphia, PA.

35. Ursula Meyer, ed., Conceptual Art (New York: E.P.Dutton, 1972) pp.2-7, 174-179.

36. See Allan Kaprow, Assemblage, Environments and Happenings (New York: Abrams, 1966), pp.195-198.

37. Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot (New York: Grove Press, 1954), p.10.

38. The difference between the replica of Duchamp's bicycle wheel at the Museum of Modern Art in New York and the lost original is of historical interest only, for there is no discernible perceptual significance. What other reason would induce a museum to display a replica than where the art lies not in the object but in the meanings it evokes?

39. In Overlay (New York: Pantheon, 1983), Lucy Lippard displays the connection of art with social functions and practices through the recognition and use of its earliest appearance in prehistoric sites and artifacts.

40. See my essay, "The Visual Arts and the Art of the Unseen," Leonardo, XII (Summer 1979), 231-235. See also, Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music (New

York: Vintage, 1956), pp.137, 140.

41. Chapter Five will show how the appreciative perception of traditional landscape painting requires active engagement. The active processes of musical experience are the subject of Chapter Eight.

42. Quoted in Walter Kerr, "What If Cain Did Not Know How to Kill Abel?," The New York Times, February 9, 1969, Section 2, p.1.

43. Alain Robbe-Grillet, "New Novel, New Man," in For a New Novel (New York: Grove Press, 1965), p.137.

44. Alain Robbe-Grillet, The Voyeur (New York: Grove Press, 1958).

45. Ralph Manheim, in the "Preface" to Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Death on the Installment Plan (New York: Signet, 1966), p.vii.

46. Annie Dillard's Living by Fiction, cited above, is a recent study that traces such features as I have been treating here through the landscape of contemporary fiction.

47. Parts Two and Three of this book develop case studies of aesthetic

participation in these and several other genres. Similar studies could be made of any art or movement.

48. Diacritical Emendations

Einführung: p.8, 1.34, 35 - umlaut over first 'u'